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1943]

NOTES AND

COMMENTS

TORTS
EFFECT OF THE BLACKOUT ON TORT LIABILITY
Comparatively few tort cases arising as a result of the blackout
have reached the higher English courts. Already, however, considerable confusion has been caused by the application of old concepts to
the new situations.' With the spread of the blackout to this country,
it is anticipated that similar confusion may arise. For this reason, a
review of the recent English decisions on this subject seems desirable. 2
The very existence of tort liability presupposes that there is a
legal duty owed to the injured person. 3 Since the English blackout
regulations are held to temporarily supersede all legal obligations in
conflict or variance therewith, 4 it is clear that a statutory duty to
provide street lighting is abrogated. 5 Therefore, it is necessary to
determine the effect of the blackout on the common law duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.
Much of the confusion surrounding the recent English cases has
been caused by an attempt to follow a World War I case, Great Central Rwy. v. Hewlett.6 In that case, Parliament had authorized the
maintenance of an obstruction which had formerly been a nuisance.7
In denying relief to a plaintiff injured in a collision therewith, 8 the
1. A Note (1943) 59 L.Q.Rev. 13 doubts whether the English cases
are reconcilable.
2. Several of the cases commented on herein are considered in Note
(1942) 136 A.L.R. 1327. A number of articles and notes on tort
liability during blackout have been published in law journals.
Those especially pertinent are: Cass, "The Blackout and Its Relation to Civil Liabilities" (1942) 22 B.U.L.Rev. 287; Ollerenshaw,
"Highway Duties in Blackouts" (1941) 15 Aust. L.J. 79; Sawer,
"Blackout Cases and Their Relation to Administrative Law" (1941)
15 Aust. L.J. 103; Notes (1941) 15 Aust. L.J. 146, (1941) 19
Can. B. Rev. 384, (1942) 8 Irish Jur. 16, (1940) 52 Jurid. Rev.
333, (1941) 91 L.J. 198, (1943) 59 L.Q. Rev. 13, (1941) 57 L.Q.
Rev. 160, (1940) 7 Sol. 15, (1941) 85 Sol. J. 87; and the following Notes on the blackout regulations: (1940) 84 Sol. J. 123,
(1940) 84 Sol. J. 87.
3. Street, "Foundations of Legal Liability" (1906) 91.
4. Wodehouse v. Levy, [1940] 2 K.B. 561; Greenwood v. Central
Service Co., Ltd., [1940] 2 K.B. 447.
5. The English blackout regulations prohibit the displaying of lights
during the hours of darkness. However, there are certain exceptions in that lights of a specified type must be used on vehicles. In addition, it is permissible, but not mandatory, to use
" . . . lamps indicating obstructions on or near the carriageway
of any road providing that they are of a candle power not exceeding 1.0, and so screened as to prevent light being thrown upwards and any appreciable glow being produced on the road
surface." See 136 A.L.R. at 1321.
6. [1916] 2 A.C. 511 (House of Lords).
7. "The company may maintain [sic] the gate posts and gates erected
by them . . . " Great Central Railway Act, 1902, 2 Edw. VII,
C. cxxxv., §31.
8. Plaintiff cab driver was moving at 6 or 7 miles per hour on a
dark, rainy night. Owing to the diminution of the street illum-
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House of Lords held that the mere power to "maintain" the post as
it then was, imposed no obligation on the defendant to warn the
public of its existence. Since the legislature had authorized the
continuance of a particular post-which it knew was not separately
guarded-it must have been of the opinion that the defendant should
not be under a duty to guard it. 9 Parliament had simply said, "It's
a nuisance, but we authorize you to maintain it henceforth without
doing more."' 0 There had been a duty on the local authorities to
light the street, but the mere fact that this duty had ceased due
to blackout regulations did not impose a new duty on the defendant. 1
In one of the first World War II cases, Wodehouse v. Levy,12 a
cab had hit an unlighted refuge, or safety-island, in the middle of
the road. Purporting to follow the Great Central case, the Court of
Appeals found that, inasmuch as the local authorities had been given
the right to erect the refuge, there was no obligation to light it other
than the general obligation to provide an adequate system of street
lighting; since that obligation had been abrogated by the blackout
regulations, there was no statutory or common law duty to light
the refuge.' 3 In Greenwood v. Central Service Co.,14 involving substantially the same facts, the court again found that since the obstruction had been erected under statutory authorization, there was no
15
duty to light it.
In Lyus v. Stepney Borough Council,1 6 a city had been authorized
to "provide and maintain" sandbins on the streets. The Court of
Appeals said that the only duty on the local authority was to exercise reasonable care in erecting the sandbins. Thereafter, its only

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

16.

ination because of blackout regulations, the post, although visible
on a clear night, could not be seen by the plaintiff.
Sawer, "Blackout Cases and Their Relation to Administrative
Law" (1941) 15 Aust. L.J. 103, 104.
See du Pareq, L.J., dissenting in Fox v. Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Corp., [1941] 2 K.B. 120, 129.
[1916] 2 A.C. 511; see also Note (1941) 57 L.Q. Rev. 160.
[1940] 2 K.B. 561. The lower court found ([1940] 2 K.B. 298)
that the blackout regulations did not entirely abrogate the
statute requiring a town to light obstructions on a highway, and
that such duty remained to the extent permitted by the regulations.
[1940] 2 K.B. 561, 569.
[1940] 2 K.B. 447.
McKinnon, L.J., said in 56 T.L.R. 944, 945 that there still
remained a common law duty to use due care to prevent the
obstruction from being a danger to highway users. However, in
Wodehouse v. Levy, [1940] 2 K.B. 561, 564, 565, the Lord Justice
corrected his earlier statement, explaining that what he meant
was that even if a common law duty had existed, there still was
no negligence on the part of the local authority.
[1941] 1 K.B. 134, 136 A.L.R. 1317 (1942). The act authorizing
the erection and maintenance of the sandbins provided that they
were not to hinder the reasonable use of the street . The lower
court held that although there was no duty upon the local authority to light the street, there was a duty to see that the sandbin did not become a danger to the public.
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duty was the statutory one of providing lights, and this duty had
been suspended. The court held that the question of hindrance to
use was to be considered as of the time of erection since the power
7
to maintain did not involve active operation.'
Again, in Jelley v. Ilford Borough Council,' 8 the same court said
that a city owes no continuing common law duty to take reasonable
care to guard against collisions with authorized obstructions.
In the reported cases decided thus far, then, it appears that the
ratio decidendi of the English courts is: (1) that the common law
duty of due care applies only to the doing of positive acts, and that
erecting and maintaining an authorized obstruction is not a positive
act, and (2) that the only duties which the local authorities can owe
with respect to authorized obstructions are those imposed by statute. 19
This reasoning is based on a broad interpretation of the rule of
the Great Central case,2 0 and has been criticized.21 A proper interpretation of the Great Central case calls for a suspension of the
common law duty of due care only where a statute authorizes the
continuance of a specific obstruction. 22 If by a reasonable exercise of
powers, either given by statute or existing at common law, the damage could be avoided, it is negligence not to make a reasonable exer"In our judgment the question whether the erection of this sandbin will hinder the reasonable user of the street by the public
is one to be considered at the time when the sandbin was
erected, and if at that time there was no such hindrance it is
difficult to see how at some later date it can be said that the
sandbin has become a hindrance to the user of the street." [1941]
1 K.B. at 146, 136 A.L.R. at 1323.
18. [1941] 2 All Eng. Rep. 468 (Court of Appeal). Plaintiff walked
into an unlighted sandbag shelter erected without full compliance
with the statute authorizing such shelters. He was denied recovery on the grounds of contributory negligence in that he was
walking too fast.
19. See Sawer, "Blackout Cases and Their Relation to Administrative
Law" (1941) 15 Aust. L.J. 103.
20. In all the cases mentioned above, the Court of Appeal reviewed
the Great Central case and found the rule of that case to be
applicable. E.g., Luxmoore, L.J., in Lyus v. Stepney Borough
Council, [1941] 1 K.B. 134, 146, 136 A.L.R. at 1325, "After it
[the sandbin] had been erected, it became an authorized obstruction . . . which the council were empowered to maintain. The
power to maintain is distinct and separate from the power to
provide and, as pointed out . . . in Great Central Railway v.
Hewlett, does not involve any active operation on the part of the
council." Being "bound" by the Great Central case, the court
held as stated earlier.
21. Sawer, "Blackout Cases and Their Relation to Administrative
Law" (1941) 15 Aust. L.J. 103; Note (1943) 59 L. Q. Rev. 13.
22. The real difficulty appears to arise through the use of the word
"maintain." In the Great Central case, "the authority was not
an authority to do anything actively . . ., but a mere authority
to leave things alone." Wrenbury, L.J., [1916] 2 A.C. at 524.
In the recent cases, the authority has been to erect and then
maintain the obstruction, being quite different from the Great
Central case.
17.
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cise of such powers. 23 The local authorities are under a common law
duty to use due care and such duty should be unaffected, in the
absence of express or implied statutory provisions to the contrary,
24
by any express statutory duty to provide a general lighting system.
It is to be noted that, in all the cases mentioned above, a small light
of the candle power permitted would probably have prevented the
accident. 25 If any power to light is allowed under the regulations,
it should be exercised. 26 The most recent of the English cases hint
that the rule of the Great Central case may be interpreted as suggested above. 2 7 It would seem to be a better view that "there is no
reason why local authorities should not be under a duty to take
ordinary precautions to make air-raid shelters and other obstructions
23.

See the opinion of Lord Blackburn in Geddes v. Proprietors of
Bann Reservoir, 3 App. Cas. 430, 455 (1878), quoted with approval by du Parcq, L.J., dissenting in Fox v. Newcastle-uponTyne Corp., [1941] 2 K.B. 120, 127, 128.
24. Sawer, "Blackout Cases and Their Relation to Administrative
Law" (1941) 15 Aust. L.J. 103; and see Morrison v. Sheffield
Corp., [1917] 2 K.B. 866. In the latter case, a statute authorized
cities to plant trees in the highways and guards could be erected
for the protection of the trees. However, this power was not
to be exercised nor were the trees to be planted so as to become
nuisances or hinder the reasonable use of the highways. The
defendant city contended that, having erected a guard around
the tree at a time when such guard was reasonably safe, there
was no further duty on it after the blackout came into effect.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals said, " . . . the obligation
on the defendants continues as long as the trees and guards are
maintained in the highway. . . . It is their duty to take reasonable care . . . and this duty is continuing . . . . The degree of care required was not exhausted by erecting the guards
so as to be reasonably safe for the protection of the public
at the time of their erection." [-1917] 2 K.B. 866, 870, 871 (per
Viscount Reading, C.J.).
25. See note 5 supra.
26. See the dissenting opinion of du Parcq in Fox v. Newcastle-uponTyne Corp., [1941] 2 K.B. 120, 134.
27. du Parcq, L.J. urges (Fox v. Newcastle etc., cited supra note 26)
that the rule of the Great Central case is not being properly
limited. In Foster v. Gillingham Corp., [1942] 1 All Eng. Rep.
304, the court pointed out that the earlier cases need reconsidering. In the latter case, the city had been under a duty to enclose any road obstructions. A barrier was erected around a
bomb crater and hurricane lights placed thereon. The local authority was found to be negligent in not keeping the lamps
lighted. The Court of Appeal distinguished the "specific authority to maintain" in the Great Central case, and found that, if
whatever means the city used to protect the public did form
an obstruction, the city had to light it insofar as permitted under the blackout regulations. Again, in the most recent case,
Knight v. Sheffield Corp., [1942] 2 All Eng. Rep. 411, the court
distinguished the Great Central case. The court said that in
constructing a shelter under statutory powers, the city was under
a duty not to create a thing which by its nature was dangerous.
It must be admitted, however, that, in this case the obstruction had
been built AFTER the blackout regulations had gone into effect.
Nevertheless, this argument was presented in Fox v. Newcastle
etc., supra, at page 124, and the court said that there was no
basis for such a distinction .
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as safe as circumstances, including the blackout, will permit."28 A
statute ought not to be interpreted as being in conflict with this
ordinary rule of law unless its words lead to no other possible con2
clusion. 0
In marked contrast to the confusion found in the above cases, the
English courts have had little trouble in defining "reasonable care
under the circumstances." They have said that to drive any vehicle
during a blackout is an operation which must involvE a considerable
degree of danger to other road-users, but, since it is permitted by law,
it is not a tort in itself.30 However, the difficulty of sight is greatly
increased and so there is a duty on all road-users to minimize the
attendant danger.3 ' If, through the failure to take some such precaution, the driver's difficulty is increased, that breach of duty is the
proximate cause of the injury.3 2 It is apparent, then, that as to this
particular problem, there is no change in the standard of care required; it is merely a question of emphasizing the word "reasonable"
as applied to a particular situation. 33
Although no cases arising because of the blackout have been
found in the American reports, at least one state has already considered legislation which marks the beginning of the approach to this
problem.34 When such cases are brought before the courts in this
country, it is believed that the more desirable solution will be found
along the lines suggested above. The result reached by such reasoning will prevent an unwarranted extension of municipal liability and
will give nevertheless reasonable protection to the public.
28. See Note (1943) 59 L.Q. Rev. 13.
29. Id.
30. Franklin v. Bristol Tramways & Carriage, Ltd., [1941] 1 All
Eng. Rep. 188.
31. The duty is higher because it is almost impossible for a driver
to see a pedestrian whereas the use of dimmed lights makes the
presence of a vehicle ascertainable if the pedestrian keeps a sharp
lookout. Franklin v. Bristol Tramways and Carriage Co., Ltd.,
cited supra note 30; Miller v. Liverpool Cooperative Society, Ltd.,
[1940] 4 All Eng. Rep. 367, aff'd, [1941] 1 All Eng. Rep. 379;
accord, MacDonald v. Star Cabs, Ltd. et al., [1943] 1 Dom. L. Rep.
420 (Sup. Ct. Br. Col.).
Similarly, vehicles must be driven
slower and greater care will be required on the part of drivers,
both as to other drivers, Miller v. Liverpool Cooperative, Ltd. et
al., supra, and as to pedestrians, MacDonald v. Star Cabs, Ltd., et
al., supra.
32. Franklin v. Bristol Tramways and Carriage Co., Ltd., supra,
note 30.
33. Notes (1941) 19 Can. B. L.384, 15 Aust. L.J. 79.
34. Mass. Laws 1942, c. 13. See Cass, "The Blackout and Its Relation to Civil Liabilities" (1942) 22 B.U.L. Rev. 287, at 288, note 5.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT AS APPLIED TO
LABOR DISPUTES.
Members of the United Mine Workers of America were working
under a contract between the union and the Indiana Coal Operators

